THE GRENFELL TOWER Inquiry has today published its final report, seven years after the fire on 14 June 2017 in which 72 people lost their lives.

The final report sets out the “path to disaster” at Grenfell, stretching back to 1991. It describes the events leading up to the fire as a “culmination of decades of failure” by central government and other construction bodies responsible for regulating fire safety in high-rise buildings.

The seven-year public inquiry criticised the “systematic dishonesty” of three manufacturers – Arconic, Celotex and Kingspan – and their attempts to mislead purchasers by using “deliberate and sustained strategies” to make their products appear safe. It also pointed out that whilst there was no evidence of dishonesty from Siderise – the manufacturer of the Lamatherm cavity barriers used in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower – some aspects of its marketing materials gave “cause for concern”.

Additionally, the report identified weaknesses in the way the Building Research Establishment (BRE) carried out tests which exposed it to the risk of manipulation by “unscrupulous” product manufacturers, and enabled Celotex and Kingspan to market their products for use in the external walls of buildings over 18 metres in height. The inquiry also pointed to the British Board of Agrément (BBA)’s “systemic shortcomings and inadequate levels of competence among its staff” as allowing Arconic and Kingspan’s “dishonest strategies” to succeed.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry Final Report

The 1,700-page report also found the architects Studio E, the builders Rydon and Harley Facades and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC)’s building control department all bore responsibility for the disastrous blaze.

During the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, Studio E, Rydon and Harley took a “casual approach to contractual relations” and “did not properly understand the nature and scope of the obligations they had undertaken”. In particular, Studio E demonstrated “a cavalier attitude to the regulations affecting fire safety” and Rydon and Harley “relied on their previous experience rather than on any technical analysis or expertise”.

The inquiry also highly criticised RBKC and its arm-length subsidiary tenant management organisation (TMO), jointly responsible for the management of fire safety at Grenfell Tower. The report found there were “chronic and systematic failings in the TMO’s compliance with the Fire Safety Order or the steps taken to enforce it”. It said despite a recommendation to the Council in 2009 that a fire safety strategy be implemented, nothing was done until November 2013 and a strategy had still not been finally approved by the time of the Grenfell Tower fire.

According to the report, TMO consistently ignored residents’ views. The TMO Chief Executive, Robert Black, established a “pattern of concealment … in relation to fire safety matters” and the TMO “treated the demands of managing fire safety as an inconvenience” in “a betrayal of its statutory obligations to its tenants”.

The Grenfell Inquiry final report describes how the fire was started by a faulty fridge in a flat on the fourth floor of Grenfell Tower. The blaze rapidly spread up the side of the tower, climbing 19 floors through the building’s combustible cladding system in just 18 minutes. Of the 72 people who died, 18 were children and 15 were disabled.

Decisions regarding prosecutions are yet to be made and criminal trials are not expected to begin until 2027, a decade after the disaster.

Recommendations for Future

Speaking about the recommendations made in the report, Sir Martin Moore-Bick, Grenfell Tower Inquiry Chair, said: “Although some steps have already been taken to respond to the many failures that we have identified, we think that more can and should be done to bring about a fundamental change in the attitudes and practices of the construction industry.

“Only such a change can ensure that in future, buildings in general and higher risk buildings in particular are safe for those who live and work in them.

“We think that in different ways, implementation of our recommendations will improve fire safety, particularly in high rise buildings, and ensure that dangerous materials cannot be used in construction in the future, they will also improve the efficiency of fire and rescue services nationally.

“Our recommendations include, but are not limited to the following:

• the appointment of a construction regulator to oversee all aspects of the construction industry, bringing responsibility for all aspects of fire safety under one government department,
• the establishment of a body of professional fire engineers, properly regulated and with protected status, and the introduction of mandatory fire safety strategies for higher risk buildings,
• a licensing scheme for contractors wishing to undertake the construction or refurbishment of higher risk buildings,
• the regulation and mandatory accreditation of fire risk assessors,
• the establishment of a college of Fire and Rescue to provide practical educational and managerial training to Fire and Rescue Services,
• and the introduction of a requirement for the government to maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by select committees, coroners and public inquiries, describing the steps taken in response to them or its reasons for declining to implement them.”

COMMENT

Kingspan

In a statement issued in response to the report, Kingspan said: “Today is another extremely difficult day for the relatives and survivors of the Grenfell Tower fire and we extend our deepest sympathies to those impacted by the tragedy.

“We welcome the publication of today’s report which is crucial to a public understanding of what went wrong and why. It explains clearly and unambiguously that the type of insulation (whether combustible or non-combustible) was immaterial, and that the principal reason for the fire spread was the PE ACM cladding, which was not made by Kingspan.

“Kingspan has long acknowledged the wholly unacceptable historical failings that occurred in part of our UK insulation business. These were in no way reflective of how we conduct ourselves as a Group, then or now. While deeply regrettable, they were not found to be causative of the tragedy.

“Kingspan has already emphatically addressed these issues, including the implementation of extensive and externally-verified measures to ensure our conduct and compliance standards are world leading.

“We remain committed to playing a leading role in providing safe and sustainable building solutions, including continuing to work with government and industry partners.”

Celotex

A statement published by Celotex said: “The publication of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry report marks the conclusion of the Inquiry’s work and we are considering its contents with care.

“Our business’ response to what happened started immediately after the fire in June 2017. We conducted our own review to interrogate the circumstances in which the RS5000 product had been tested, launched and marketed. This review was a significant and thorough undertaking, and the results of that work were disclosed promptly and proactively to relevant stakeholders, including the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.

“Independent testing commissioned following the review demonstrated that the cladding system described in the Celotex RS5000 marketing literature met the relevant safety criteria. That system was substantially different to that used at Grenfell Tower. Decisions about design, construction and the selection of materials for the Tower were made by construction industry professionals.

“Since the fire, we reviewed and improved process controls, quality management and the approach to marketing within the Celotex business to meet industry best practice. Celotex Limited continues to cooperate fully with all official investigations into the Grenfell Tower fire.

“We reiterate our sympathies to everyone affected by the fire.”

Arconic

Cladding manufacturer Arconic also responded to the report: “Arconic’s subsidiary, Arconic Architectural Products SAS (AAP), supplied sheets of aluminium composite material that were used to manufacture the rainscreen for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment.

“The fire was a terrible tragedy and as Arconic remembers the 72 people who died, our thoughts remain with the families, friends and all of those affected.

“AAP was a core participant in the Inquiry and has acknowledged its role as one of the material suppliers involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower.

“The company respects the inquiry process. AAP cooperated fully with the work of the Inquiry and will continue to engage with further legal processes. Together with other parties, AAP has made financial contributions to settlements for those affected, as well as to the restorative justice fund.

“Throughout the Inquiry, AAP has maintained a number of points:

• AAP sold sheets of aluminium composite material as specified in the design process. This product was safe to use as a building material, and legal to sell in the UK as well as the more than thirty other countries in which AAP customers purchased the product. We reject any claim that AAP sold an unsafe product.
• AAP regularly conducted tests of its materials using third-party testing bodies. Reports on these results were all publicly available, and AAP made these reports available to its customers.
• AAP did not conceal information from or mislead any certification body, customer, or the public.”

Federation of Master Builders (FMB)

Brain Berry, Chief Executive of the Federation of Master Builders (FMB) said: “While the nation’s local builders are, for the most part, far removed from work that has been investigated as part of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, it does not mean they are precluded from improving industry standards. Domestic builders do not have minimum competence levels; they are not a protected profession like plumbers or electricians. If industry and government are serious about delivering competence, then introducing minimum standards for entry into domestic building work is a must – this is competence from the ground up.

“The new government needs to turn away from a culture of cutting regulation, which in part has led to poor building safety, and license domestic builders, underpinning the building regime with minimum standards. Why should homeowners not share in the safety net implemented post-Grenfell? Without minimum standards, unregulated or ‘dodgy’ building work will continue, and the industry will not shake off its poor reputation, which is driven by rogue operators plying their trade free from consequence.

“However, where government has tried to regulate domestic builders, through the Building Safety Act, mostly for work involving building control, they have only outlined high level requirements without any underpinning competence. This has left builders confused and worried about committing to work they feel they may no longer be competent to do. The new Government must address this immediately, so industry has clear guidance.”

CIBSE

CIBSE Technical Director, Dr Anastasia Mylona, commented: “The findings of the Grenfell Inquiry report are both sobering and a stark reminder of the critical need for transparency, integrity and robust regulation within our industry. As the report highlights systemic failures, CIBSE remains committed to driving the necessary reforms in building and fire safety engineering practices. Our role is to ensure that the highest standards are upheld, and that the safety of residents is always the paramount concern in the built environment. ”

RIBA

RIBA Chair of Board, Jack Pringle, said: “The failures which led to the fire were system-wide, with myriad contributing factors in the years preceding, on the morning of, and in the aftermath of the tragedy.

“The report makes clear that people’s safety requires reform of structures and regulations. This includes systemic change within the construction industry, and a fundamental shift in culture and behaviours. This is a collaborative endeavour and RIBA has committed to playing a leading role.

“As the Inquiry also notes, RIBA has taken steps since June 2017 to improve education and training in our profession. With the benefit of these comprehensive findings, and as recommended, we will review the measures already introduced.

“Many of the report’s insights and recommendations, particularly on the role and responsibilities of an architect, have great relevance for our members. We will take time to study them in detail, update our members, and continue to play an active role in the creation of a safer built environment.”

Electrical Contractors’ Association (ECA)

ECA Chief Operating Officer, Andrew Eldred, said: “Today’s report once again shines a spotlight on the imperative for improved standards of competence in the built environment.

“Thanks to stronger collaboration across the electrical industry in recent years, we undoubtedly find ourselves better placed to meet these higher standards than most other installer sectors, even if there is more that still needs to be done.

“Through ECA’s active participation in the Construction Leadership Council, Working Group 2 and the British Standards Institute, we are also doing all we can to assist improvements across the entire built environment – including pointing to good practice examples in the training, assessment and certification arrangements which the electrical industry already has in place.”

ECA Director of Technical and HS&E, Mike Smith, added: “We welcome changes made to the Building Regulations, particularly duties to employ competent organisations and individuals, ensure collaboration within design and construction teams, mandate reporting of compliance and safety issues, and professionalise consent and approvals processes.

“Enforcement of the rules has historically been a weak spot. Which is why we strongly support the introduction of the Building Safety Regulator, to oversee changes and deploy a strict regime for higher risk buildings that continues through the life of the building.”

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